CRIMINAL LAW CASES

Chapter 4

Actus Reus

4.01 The Act

Martin v. State

12 So. 2d 427 (Ala. Ct. App. 1994)

 Appellant convicted of being drunk on a public highway, arrested at home and brought to

the highway, where he allegedly “committed proscribed acts, manifested a drunken

condition by using loud and profane language.”

 Statute: “Any person who, while intoxicated or drunk, appears in any public place where

one or more persons are present, and manifests a drunken condition by boisterous or

indecent conduct, or loud and profane discourse, shall, on conviction, be fined.”

 Under statute, a voluntary appearance is presumed. He was involuntarily and forcibly

carried to that place by the arresting officer.

 Reversed and rendered.

Cox v. Director of Revenue

98 S.W.3d 548 (Mo. 2003)

 Circuit court ruled Director of Revenue improperly suspended driving privileges of

Steven R. Cox. Director appeals.

 Saturday, August 15, 1998 at 10:20 PM, Cox sleeping in the driver’s seat behind the

wheel of a vehicle in the parking lot of a gas station, being the only one around.

 Key was in the ignition, motor running, car was in “park”.

 Awoken, lowered the window, he was intoxicated with a bottle in between his legs and

he failed a sobriety test after shutting off his motor.

 Blood alcohol content of 0.18, answered “yes” to if he was operating the vehicle.

 Took it to circuit court, Cox argued that the officer did not observe him “operating” or

“driving” the vehicle.

 Term driving in section 577.001.1 – “physically driving or operating a motor vehicle”,

used to mean “being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle” until 1996.

 Dictionary definition of driving – “to guide a vehicle along or through.”

 Officer had probable cause to believe that Cox was operating the vehicle, with no other

issues, the Director properly suspended Cox’s license.

 Dissenting judge – “To give effect to the legislative amendment, “operating” must mean

more than keeping restrained a motionless vehicle, even while in a position to operate it.”

 Cox is able to start his car for comfort, say if he needs air conditioning or heat.

4.02 Omission as Actus Reus

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West v. Commonwealth

935 S.W.2d 315 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996)

 Appeal from final judgements of Montgomery Circuit Court sentencing each of the

appellants to one-year imprisonment. Appellant Russell West guilty of reckless homicide

and his co-defendant, Appellant Ann West, guilty of complicity to reckless homicide.

Conviction affirmed.

 The Wests, husband and wife, alleged to have caused the death of Lillian West, Russell’s

55-year-old disabled sister by failure to care adequately for her physical needs to secure

the medical assistance she required.

 Lillian west born with Down’s Syndrome and a heart ailment. Cared by her mother until

they moved in with appellants in 1979.

 In 1983, mother Rebekah West passed away, and Russell and Ann accepted responsibility

for Lillian’s care. Russell believed Lillian was being abused at Pathway Shelter and

notified personnel that she would not continue to participate in the program.

 1992 Lillian became confined to her bed. Condition declined, refused to eat.

 December 1992 Russell delivered Lillian to the emergency room, social worker was

undertaken to investigate Lillian’s home environment.

 Lillian died on January 17, 1993. Russell was indicted for manslaughter in the second

degree on March 2, 1993 with Ann as a complicitor. Lillian’s cause of death was sepsis

and confluent bronchial pneumonia precipitated by decubitus ulcers. Testified that

caretaker neglect led to Lillian’s death.

 A person is not guilty of a criminal offense unless:

1. He has engaged in conduct which [indicates] a voluntary act or the omission to

perform a duty which the law imposes upon him and which he is physically

capable of performing; AND

2. He has engaged in such conduct intentionally, knowingly, wantonly, or recklessly

as the law may require, with respect to each element of the offense.

 Wests appeal saying neither of them had a duty to care for Lillian or provide her with

medical assistance. “The legislature must have envisioned that an act would form the

basis of a conviction under the reckless homicide statute rather than a mere omission.”

 KRS 209.020(6) – “ ‘Caretaker’ means an individual or institution who has the

responsibility for the care of the adult as a result of family relationship, or who has

assumed the responsibility for the care of the adult person voluntarily, or by contract, or

agreement.”

 It was held that Russell voluntarily accepted responsibility for Lillian’s care and

thereafter isolating her from contacts that might have resulted in her aid or assistance and

that Russell’s duty of care is well-grounded in the law, justice affirmed.

4.03 Possession as Actus Reus

State v. Winsor

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110 S.W.3d 882 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003)

 Appellant was charged with one count of Class C felony of possession of a controlled

substance on the premises of a county jail. On trial August 15, 2002 saying the case was

based on facts without presenting any addition evidence at the trial. Appellant got three

years in the Department of Corrections but suspended it, placing him on five years of

probation.

 Appellant was charged under Section 221.111.1, stating:

o No person shall knowingly deliver, attempt to deliver, have in his possession,

deposit or conceal in or about the premises of any county jail or other county

correctional facility.

o Any controlled substance as the term is defined by law, except upon the written

prescription of a licensed physician, dentist, or veterinarian.

 Defense under section 562.011.1, RSMo 2000, “a person is not guilty of an offense

unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act.” And a voluntary

act is defined by section 562.011 as:

o A bodily movement performed while conscious as a result of effort or

determination, OR

o An omission to perform an act of which the actor is physically capable.

 Appellant claims that possession of a controlled substance is inadequate, by itself, to

satisfy the elements of the offense. Possession of marijuana on county jail premises does

not constitute a voluntary act because he was taken onto the county jail’s premises

against his will.

 The offense for which Appellant was charged does not require Appellant’s voluntary

presence on the premise. The statute only requires his voluntary possession of a

controlled substance while in or about the county jail.

 Appellant’s interpretation of the statute is not adopted since “Construction of statutes

should avoid unreasonable or absurd results.”

 Appellant willfully possessed a controlled substance in or about the county jail. For that

reason, Appellant’s sole point on appeal is denied.

4.04 Status or Condition

Robinson v. California

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370 U.S. 660 (1962)

 California statute makes it a criminal offense for a person to “be addicted to the use of

narcotics.” Draws into question the constitutionality of the provision of the state law.

 Appellant had scar tissue and discoloration on the inside of his right arm and what

appeared to be numerous needle marks and a scab which was approximately three inches

below the crook of his elbow on his left arm, as testified by Officer Brown.

 Appellant admitted to the occasional use of narcotics.

 Officer Lindquist, a police officer with 10 years of experience as a member of the

Narcotic Division of the Los Angeles Police Department, noted that these marks and

discoloration were the result of the injection of hypodermic needles into the tissue into

the vein that was not sterile. At the time of examination, appellant was not under the

influence of narcotics.

 Appellant denied conversations with police and explained the marks have been from an

allergic condition contracted during military service.

 The appellant could be convicted if the appellant’s “status” or “chronic condition” was

that of being “addicted to the use of narcotics” as was the verdict of the jury.

 This statute in particular punishes a person for the use of narcotics, for their purchase,

sale or possession, or for the antisocial or disorderly behavior resulting from their

administration. There was also no proof that appellant had used narcotics within the state

of California.

 Rule: A state law that imprisons as a criminal a person afflicted with a narcotic

addiction, even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the state or been

guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in

violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

 The Supreme Court of the United States found § 11721 to be unconstitutional for

inflicting cruel and unusual punishment. The Court concluded that § 11721 made the

status of being addicted to the use of narcotics a criminal offense, whether or not an

accused ever used or possessed narcotics within California or had been guilty of any

antisocial behavior there.

Sec. 2-2. "Act". "Act" includes a failure or omission to take action.

Sec. 4-1. Voluntary act. A material element of every offense is a voluntary act, which includes

an omission to perform a duty which the law imposes on the offender and which he is physically

capable of performing.

Sec. 4-2. Possession as voluntary act. Possession is a voluntary act if the offender knowingly

procured or received the thing possessed, or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient time

to have been able to terminate his possession.

Chapter 5

Mens Rea

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